A succession of deadly attacks in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has exposed the continuing ability of militant groups to strike heavily protected security targets despite intensified military operations, raising fresh questions over whether Islamabad’s counter-terrorism strategy can deliver lasting security in the country’s northwest.
The scale of the challenge was demonstrated in Kohat on September 18, when a vehicle packed with explosives was driven into the perimeter of a police compound during Friday prayers. Armed attackers then entered the complex, triggering a prolonged gun battle with security forces.
The death toll subsequently rose to 23, including 17 police personnel and six civilians, according to Pakistani reporting. More than 100 people were injured. Security forces killed eight attackers during an overnight clearance operation.
The target was significant. The compound housed police units involved in counter-terrorism and intelligence operations, demonstrating the attackers’ ability to penetrate a major security installation rather than limiting themselves to softer civilian targets.
Initial reporting differed over responsibility. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP, denied involvement. Subsequent reporting attributed a claim of responsibility to Ittihadul Mujahideen Pakistan, an alliance led by the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. Pakistani authorities use the designation “Fitna al-Khawarij” broadly for the TTP and associated militant networks.
The Kohat assault was followed by another serious encounter in neighbouring Hangu.
On September 20, six Pakistan Army personnel, including Captain Abuzar Farooq and Lieutenant Sheraz Babar, were killed when a security forces convoy encountered militants. The military’s Inter-Services Public Relations said eight militants were killed in the ensuing exchange of fire.
The two incidents, separated by barely two days and occurring in adjoining districts, illustrate the pressure confronting security forces across parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
They also complicate Islamabad’s repeated claims that sustained counter-terrorism operations are degrading militant networks.
Pakistan has responded aggressively. Following the Kohat and Hangu attacks, security forces conducted intelligence-based ground operations around Kohat, Hangu and Thall. The government said nine militants were killed during one phase of the operation before strikes were carried out against militant camps and hideouts in the Afghanistan border region.
Pakistan’s Ministry of Information subsequently said 37 militants had been killed in the combined operations. That figure is an official government account and has not been independently verified.
Islamabad has also taken the fight across the border.
Pakistan said it carried out strikes against militant positions in Afghanistan on September 21, reporting that 28 militants had been killed. Afghan Taliban authorities condemned the strikes and summoned Pakistan’s chargé d’affaires. The United Nations and Afghan officials said three civilians, including a girl, were killed.
The strikes underline how Pakistan’s domestic security crisis has become increasingly intertwined with its deteriorating relationship with Afghanistan.
Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban government of allowing the TTP and allied groups to operate from Afghan territory. Kabul rejects the accusation and has repeatedly said Pakistan should address the causes of militancy within its own borders.
The dispute has become one of the most serious points of friction between the two neighbours since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in August 2021.
For Pakistan, however, the immediate problem remains inside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Independent security assessments show that militant violence has persisted despite an expanding counter-terrorism campaign. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies recorded 118 militant attacks nationwide in June, with violence concentrated particularly in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the former tribal districts.
The situation deteriorated further in July. PICSS recorded 606 deaths from militant attacks and counter-militancy operations during the month, making it the deadliest month of 2026 at that point. Among those killed were 112 security personnel, the highest monthly security-force toll since January 2023 and the second highest in more than a decade, according to the institute.
PICSS assessments have identified Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as an epicentre of militant violence and concluded that militant organisations have retained the capacity to conduct high-impact attacks even as security forces increase operational pressure.
That distinction is central to assessing Pakistan’s counter-terrorism campaign.
Security forces continue to kill significant numbers of militants and dismantle hideouts. But tactical successes measured through militants killed or positions cleared do not necessarily amount to durable control if armed groups retain the ability to regroup, move across districts and attack security installations.
The pattern is particularly visible in districts where Pakistan has conducted repeated operations over many years.
Tank, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Khyber, Hangu and Kohat have all experienced varying levels of renewed militant activity. In July, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government approved military operations across eight districts, including Kohat, Tank, Khyber, Kurram, Bajaur, Lakki Marwat, Bannu and Waziristan. Attacks nevertheless continued.
Open-source reporting on X reinforces the picture of sustained militant activity, although individual battlefield claims require caution.
Posts circulating around the Hangu and Kohat incidents showed the aftermath of attacks, security deployments and funerals of personnel killed in the fighting. Other material attributed to militant channels has purported to show attacks on military and police positions elsewhere in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Such footage can help establish locations, attack methods and operational patterns when independently geolocated, but militant casualty claims should not be treated as confirmed without corroboration.
The broader X information environment also reveals a contest over how the violence is described. Pakistani state and military accounts routinely refer to TTP militants as “Fitna al-Khawarij” and have alleged foreign sponsorship, including Indian involvement. These are Pakistani government claims. Publicly available reporting on the recent Kohat and Hangu incidents does not independently establish Indian involvement.
Conversely, TTP and associated militant propaganda frequently exaggerates Pakistani security-force casualties or presents temporary movement through an area as evidence of territorial control. Those claims also require independent verification.
The underlying security trend is clearer than either side’s information campaign.
Militant organisations remain capable of ambushing military convoys, attacking police posts and mounting complex assaults against fortified installations. Pakistan’s security forces remain capable of responding with substantial ground and air power and killing large numbers of fighters. Neither fact cancels out the other.
The result is a cycle increasingly visible across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: an attack is followed by a clearance or intelligence-based operation, militants are reported killed, security forces announce sanitisation of the area, and violence subsequently reappears in the same district or elsewhere.
Pakistan’s military describes its current campaign under the Azm-e-Istehkam framework as a sustained effort to eliminate militancy. Following the Hangu deaths, ISPR said the campaign would continue at “full pace”.
Yet the Kohat attack demonstrated the distance between maintaining operational pressure and establishing durable security. Militants were able to reach a police complex housing counter-terrorism units, breach its perimeter and force an operation lasting roughly 20 hours.
The resurgence also imposes costs that extend beyond military casualties. Police officers, civilians and communities across the province remain exposed to bombings, ambushes and the disruption caused by repeated security operations.
Pakistan can point to substantial militant losses and continued counter-terrorism operations. The militants can point to their continuing ability to inflict casualties on the state. Neither provides evidence that the conflict is approaching a decisive end.
For Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, that is the central problem. The challenge facing Pakistan is no longer simply whether its forces can clear militants from a particular location. They have repeatedly demonstrated that capability. It is whether the state can prevent armed networks from returning, rebuilding and striking again after the operation has ended.
